In "Conceiving God: Literal and Figurative Prompt for a More Tectonic Distinction" Robert Masson criticizes my claim that some concepts of God can be literal in the sense of a non-extended meaning as defined by cognitive linguists. He claims that all of our ideas for God can only be through extended meanings (what is typically called figurative language). He says that blending theory requires this conclusion. In response I make three points. First, I argue that this is not what cognitive linguistics requires. Second, that Masson fails to ever show that "God is an agent" is actually a single scope or double scope blend. Third, I suggest that behind our dispute are different metaphysical commitments regarding divine transcendence. Because I reject his understanding of divine transcendence and he fails to show that divine agency must be understood only in an extended sense, I conclude that religious believers can legitimately claim that some of their ideas of God are literal (non-extended meanings).
to understand and relate to God. Each of us uses the mental tools identified by cognitive linguistics to do theology. We also agree with the cognitive linguistic claim that much of our human reasoning about any topic is figurative rather than literal and that figurative concepts can be true. We agree that cognitive linguistics has shown that much of what people ordinarily take to be literal is, in fact, figurative. For example, "I see your point now" may seem to be a literal statement but it is actually a metaphor in which the domain of vision is applied (mapped) onto argumentation. "Our relationship has come a long way" uses our experience of traveling to understand the nature of a particular relationship. Cognitive linguists say that vision and travel are being used in "extended" senses in order to reason about argumentation and relationships. In short, argumentation is not literally vision and long term relationships do not literally travel. Furthermore, we agree that most of our notions about God are figurative in the sense of being metaphorical or double scope blends. These are but a few of the important ideas upon which we agree.
Masson says that my claim that some concepts of God can be used in a non-extended way is "simplistic" and fails to understand how blending theory has rendered the distinction between literal and figurative unhelpful. In short, he thinks my use of "literal" (non-extended meaning) in association with God amounts to cognitive linguistic malpractice. At a theology conference a few years ago I said that some concepts about God could be literal. Audible gasps could be heard from my fellow panelists. People looked at me as though I was some sort of fundamentalist or theological dinosaur. Given this environment, I hesitate to use the word even though I follow its definition according to cognitive linguistics: a meaning not dependent upon a figurative extension from another meaning. Let me say that I have no fetish about retaining the word "literal." Again, I believe that most of our ideas about God are figurative (extended senses) and I affirm that figurative language can be true. Yet, the terms literal and figurative continue to have a place in cognitive linguistics. Masson seems to think the word "literal" has caused so many problems that we are better off without it. In my book, I discuss some of these problems but find a role for the word nonetheless. It seems to me that some of our notions of God can be used in non-extended senses. I am not saying that some ideas of God must be literal.
In "Conceiving God" Robert Masson rejects my claim that it is justifiable for religious believers to hold that some of their concepts of God are literal in the sense of having non-extended meanings. In particular, he claims that saying "God is an agent" cannot be meant in the way I intend. He writes: "Mapping agency to God requires an extension of meaning. . ."1 and "God is properly an agent but only in a . . . extended understanding of agency"2. Hence, we can say God has the characteristics of an agent but only in a highly refined fashion that results from double scope blends.
For those unfamiliar with the types of blending described by Fauconnier and Turner in The Way We Think, some brief comments may help. An example of a simplex blend is "Susan is Alex's mother." In this case, Susan has the "role" of being the mother to Alex and so the individual named Susan is blended together with mother to form a particular meaning. Because the meaning of "mother" is not an "extended" sense from another meaning, it is classified as a "literal" statement. Biblical writers use all the types of blends for God including simplex. Some examples of simplex blends are "Yahweh is the God of Israel" and "God raised Jesus from the dead." An example of a single scope blend (metaphor) is "Yahweh is the husband of Israel." Here, "husband" is used in an "extended" sense because God is not actually a husband but is thought of "as if" God is a husband. An example of a double scope blend is "Yahweh is the potter and Israel is the clay." Here we have a very complex set of roles and individuals that are blended together. The covenant relationship between God and Israel are blended together with information about the relationship between potters and clay. In reading this, we do not think Israel is literally clay but, rather, that aspects of clay are merged together with aspects of being an ethnic group so that clay now has a will of its own that refuses to do what the potter desires.
In Theology in the Flesh I cite well known Jewish and Christian Hebrew Bible scholars who say that biblical writers took some characteristics of God literally. What is not always clear, say these scholars, is which characteristics they took literally. For instance, some biblical writers may have meant that God literally has hands while other authors considered the divine "hands" either metonymically or metaphorically. 3 Masson correctly says that Fauconnier and Turner have problematized the distinction between literal and figurative language.4 But then he claims that double scope blends are "neither literal or figurative in the conventional senses of those terms nor in the specialized senses given in cognitive linguistics."5 I take this to mean that he believes that cognitive linguists do not classify double scope blends as figurative. However, in their book Figurative Language, cognitive linguists Dancygier and Sweetser explicitly say that double scope blends are figurative-they are extended senses. 6 Masson says that double scope blends are neither literal or metaphorical but he then says "the blend is literal and figurative all the way down."7 To escape this apparent contradiction, he changes the meaning of "literal" from the specified sense of non-extended meaning to the sense of "actual."8 I take this to mean that, for example, we can say that God is "actually" (truly) the husband of Israel and we can say that God is "actually" an agent. Metaphors and double scope blends can be actual (true) and so Masson says we can call them "literal" in this extended sense. I find this move unhelpful. He has redefined the meaning of the term literal but this does not solve our problem since I claim that some concepts of God can be used in non-extended ways and he rejects this. For Masson, God is not an agent in a non-extended sense of agency. Hence, Masson claims that God is not "literally" an agent in the sense used by cognitive linguists Dancygier and Sweetser.
Mark Turner, one of the developers of blending theory, has a chapter called "The Literal Versus Figurative Dichotomy" that may help us. He says that different statements will seem literal or figurative to us depending on the type of network (blend) used and the degree of familiarity (entrenchment) we have with the concept. He goes through the different kinds of blends (networks) and provides examples to show that in each type of blend there are cases that will seem literal to us while other cases seem obviously figurative. For example, "I see the point you are making" may feel like a literal (non-extended) sense to us because it is so widely used in English. But, as discussed above, "see" is actually used in an extended sense here-it is a single scope blend. Familiar metaphors (single scope blends) can feel literal to us when they are actually using an extended sense. On the other hand, simplex blends typically seem literal to us. For instance, "Susan is Alex's mother" seems obviously literal to us. Turner says that simplex networks are usually literal (non-extended). Yet, he notes that even simplex blends may not always be literal. For example, he says that "Zeus is the father of Sarpedon" may seem literal to us because it uses the kinship space and a human mother is involved. However, the idea of immortality is mapped onto Sarpedon and Turner feels that this makes it "less literal." Another example he uses is "fire station." This strikes us as completely literal but a fire station does not actually have fire, give away fire, or receive fire. We are so familiar with categorizing fire stations according to their purpose-dealing with fires-that the term seems literal to us. So, familiar metaphors and double scope blends may feel literal to us when they actually are not and simplex blends are typically literal but can be non-literal.
Following Turner, one could claim that the statement "God is an agent" seems literal (non-extended) to the Christian community Sanders inhabits but this is mistaken because "God is an agent" is actually on par with "I see your point" (a metaphor). "God is an agent" is deeply entrenched in this Christian community and so feels literal but it is actually a single or double scope blend (an extended sense of agency). Perhaps Masson has something like this in mind. If he does, then Masson needs to show the single or double scope blend at work. That is, he needs to explain or "run" the blend of agency. In the example, "I see your point," we can show that "see" is used in an extended sense. But Masson fails to do this in the article. Instead, over and over again he merely repeats the claim that "God is an agent" is a double scope blend. He fails to 3 Today there are people who believe God is our literal father (Mormons believe God and his wife gave birth to us as spirit beings) but most take divine "fatherhood" metaphorically. explain why it is and never maps the supposed double scope blend of divine agency. He unpacks the double scope blend of "Jesus is the Messiah" but this is not the point in dispute. In order to make his claim stick he needs to show that "God is an agent" is, in fact, a double scope blend. Since he does not do this, we are left with his unsupported claim.
In Theology in the Flesh I present a cumulative case type of argument to provide justification for those religious believers who think God is actually an agent in a non-extended sense of agency. The goal is to provide reasons why the vast majority of religious believers throughout history are warranted to conceive of God with the characteristics of agency. There is no attempt to prove that God is an agent in the sense that people are irrational if they do not construe God this way.
Masson claims that my reasoning is circular and assumes that God is an agent. My argument is not circular but I do make several assumptions because I, as a theologian, work within a specific Christian tradition that affirms that God creates, reveals, guides, redeems, and the like. In the book, I say that if God has these kinds of characteristics, then it is fitting to think of God as agent. In particular, my theology pays attention to what God has done through Israel and especially in Jesus in whom "the whole fullness of deity dwells in bodily form" (Col. 2:9).9 I believe the incarnation of the Son of God discloses the triune God who loves creatures: God so loved the world that God sent the divine son to redeem it (John 3:16). Love and sending are aspects of a particular sort of agency and so I reason about God from within this narrative. In Theology in the Flesh, I cite the Catholic philosopher, Jean-Luc Marion, who says in his book, God Without Being, that Christian theology should begin with the God of love incarnate in Jesus instead of with the metaphysics of being. Additionally, various Christian communities teach believers how to recognize God's activity in their lives. Many Christians believe God guides them and responds to their prayers. Again, in such communities one will understand God to be an agent at work in their lives. I do not believe this is circular. It simply admits the historical and confessional locations that guide my thinking about God. In the chapter defending divine agency, I acknowledge that some in the Christian tradition reject divine agency and they have sophisticated arguments for their position.
Even prominent cognitive linguists, such as Eve Sweetser, are willing to say we have some literal (nonextended) concepts of God. Sweeter and biblical scholar Therese DesCamp say the "impoverished literal linguistic models for Divinity are a natural result of the fact that the human experience of God is relatively intersubjectively inaccessible."10 There are a couple of ideas in this statement that are important to unpack. First, we have a range of experiences regarding what is intersubjectively accessible. For example, the firmness of the chair I'm sitting in is distinctively available to my experience. The love my mother has for me is quite accessible to me yet, it is less so than the chair. God's love for me is even less intersubjectively accessible than our experience of a mother's love. Metaphors and double scope blends are very important tools used to help us understand entities and events that are less intersubjectively accessible. Second, Sweetser and DesCamp say that experiences of God, such as God comforting or communicating with us, give rise to some literal ideas of God. Not all of our experiences of God are necessarily figurative. However, most of our richer understandings of God make use of metaphors and double scope blends in order to facilitate a more thorough experience of God.
God is not the only entity that is less intersubjectively available to us. Atoms and time are as well which is why we use figurative language to make them more accessible. We do have some literal (non-extended) understandings of time such as circadian rhythms and heart beats. Lakoff and Johnson say there are "literal aspects of time such as directionality and irreversibility."11 Yet, our most sophisticated understandings of time involve metaphors and double scope blends. Time is less intersubjectively accessible to us so we use ideas from other domains and use them with extended senses in order to make sense or our experience more fully. Hence, just because an entity is less intersubjectively available does not entail that we lack experiences of it or cannot speak of it in some literal (non-extended) senses.
In this section I have argued that my use of "literal" in the sense of a non-extended meaning is in compliance with the way cognitive linguists use the term. Masson's claim that my use is not in harmony with cognitive linguistics is incorrect. In addition, I showed that Masson changed the meaning of "literal" (non-extended meaning) to actual (an extended meaning). However, this does not settle our dispute because the issue is whether we can have non-extended meanings. I claim that some concepts of God can be used in non-extended senses and Masson says that all of our concepts of God are used only in extended senses. Finally, I argued that if Masson thinks I am mistaken, then he needs to show that the concept "God is an agent" is always used in extended senses. Since he makes no attempt to do this, I see no reasons from cognitive linguistics to change my position.
Divine transcendence and literal meaning
I believe that Masson and I have some different understandings of the nature of God which motivate us to different conclusions on this issue. He says it is "proper" to say "God is an agent" so long we understand that we are using agency in an extended sense here. Masson says that attributing agency to God "requires an extension of meaning" from the human to the divine so it is simplistic and wrongheaded to think that God is an agent in a non-extended sense.12 Why? His article does not clearly explain why it must be this way but there are some hints.
One clue is when he says there are important distinctions between a "transcendent 'agent' to whom we do not have access in any ordinary way" and human embodied agents.13 He claims that attributing agency to God is "inherently and unavoidably" metaphorical. However, as shown in the previous section, just because an entity is intersubjectively less accessible to us does not necessitate that all concepts about it must be figurative. Masson claims that the distinction between the divine and creature is so great that all of our concepts of God have to be used in extended ways. Of course, Christians have always distinguished between divine agents and human agents-they are not identical. In Theology in the Flesh I say that God is different from creatures but that God has some characteristics in common with creatures. Masson expresses revulsion at this idea when he says, "God's transcendence does not have to be compromised so completely."14 He accuses me of undermining divine transcendence but he does explain why this is the case. In Theology in the Flesh I discuss a range of meanings of divine transcendence. It is legitimate to disagree with the position I take but merely expressing disgust at my view does not persuade me to change it.
This reminds me of a dialogue in The Horse and His Boy (one of the Chronicles of Narnia by C. S. Lewis).15 The characters discuss the nature of Aslan and one of them asks, "But is he a lion?" The horse (Bree) says, "No, no, of course not." He continues: "it would be quite absurd to suppose he is a real lion. Indeed it would be disrespectful. If he was a lion he'd have to be a Beast just like the rest of us. Why!" (and here Bree began to laugh) "If he was a lion he'd have four paws, and tail, and Whiskers!" The horse asserts it is absurd and disrespectful to think God has these characteristics in common with creatures. Lewis informs us which side of the debate he is on when, right after Bree condescendingly says Aslan would have whiskers, Aslan appears and tickles Bree's ear with his whiskers.
Masson works within a Thomistic understanding of transcendence while I do not. Masson says God does not fit into any of our categories. "God is beyond this sort of description"16 and "The way we conceive God is anthropogenic but differs from the way we conceive other realities".17 That is, God is a unique entity that cannot be conceptualized like any other entity in our experience. How does he know that none of our categories apply to God? Many Christians experience God in worship and prayer and believe that some of their categories apply to God. For instance, they believe God loves them so God fits our categories of agency and love. According to Masson's view, saying "God loves creatures" and "God is an agent" stretch human language because God does not fit these categories. That is, God is not loving or an agent in the ways humans understand these terms. How does one know that our words cannot mean what humans mean if we apply them to God? Consider the difference between baby talk and the language adults regularly speak. In order to know that an adult is talking "baby talk" to an infant one has to know what "adult talk" is like in order to contrast it with baby talk. Similarly, in order to know that none of our categories apply to God one has to know something about the nature of God-what God is really like. How does Masson know what God is really like? How does he know that none of our categories apply to God? He does not provide the arguments but he does give a hint when he mentions Sokolowski's book, which speaks of "the" distinction. For him, the most important distinction is the one that differentiates the creator from creatures. Masson says, "the distinction between God and creatures is not like any distinction between creatures themselves".18
I agree with the Christian tradition that God is different from creatures in many important respects. For instance, God is uncreated and everlasting. God is different from creatures but this assertion has at least two different meanings: (1) God is not completely like anything in creation or (2) God is completely unlike anything in creation. I affirm (1) meaning that God is not identical to anything in creation. God is different but not completely different. The theological tradition Masson seems to follow affirms (2). The theological heritage I participate in begins with the narratives of Israel and the gospel of Jesus as important sources for our knowledge of what God is like. I claim to know something about what God is like because Jesus is "the exact imprint of God's very being" (Heb. 1:4). Jesus discloses what God is like and this revelation informs us that God shares some characteristics with us. In addition, God created humans in the image of God so there is some sort of similarity between God and humans. In short, my theology draws upon shared features between God and creatures along with an interactive relationship with God. Some of these features such as agency are understood in non-extended (literal) senses. My theological community does not think "as if" God is an agent. It thinks God is an agent in a non-extended sense. Those in the Thomistic tradition find this unpalatable. Those of us on the other side believe the understanding of transcendence affirmed by Masson undermines the basic Christian message.19 In particular, we believe it leads to agnosticism about God.20
The key point is that the reason Masson and I disagree whether any concepts of God are non-extended (literal) is because we have different views of divine transcendence and the nature of God's relationship to creatures. We have different metaphysical commitments that are, in part, a result of very different theological heritages in which we work. Though we both use cognitive linguistics to understand theological reasoning, we have different understandings of divine transcendence.
Conclusion
Masson criticizes me for saying that some concepts of God can be used in literal senses as defined in cognitive linguistics as meanings that are non-extended. Masson claims that all of our ideas for God can only be through extended meanings. He claims that "God is an agent" is comparable to "Our relationship has come a long way." However, he never shows that "God is an agent" is a single or double scope blend. He merely asserts that it is. Since my Christian community means divine agency in a non-extended sense and Masson provides no evidence that divine agency is actually an extended meaning, I see no reason to change my mind. I see nothing in cognitive linguistics that necessitates the impossibility of thinking "God is an agent" in a non-extended sense. In addition, the metaphysical reasons at but I find these approaches harmful. Masson and I agree that most of our rich conceptions of God are figurative (extended senses). Yet, we disagree whether any of our concepts of God can be used in nonextended senses. I conclude that religious believers are justified to think that divine agency can be meant in a non-extended (literal) sense.21
